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INTRODUCTION 
Most lawyers have to stop momentarily and think about who is who when 
confronting isolated uses of terms like "lessor and lessee" and "mortgagor and 
mortgagee". And no doubt mistakes are occasionally made. But no mistake was made 
here. The very first paragraph of the Leasehold Exception explicitly identifies ASCU as 
the "Mortgagor" and Wolf Mountain as the "Mortgagee." Those terms are used 100 
times in the Leasehold Mortgage, including 27 times in the due-on-sale provision 
(paragraph 4(a)). 
ASCU's position is that the parties got it right every time, except for two 
consecutive instances in the Second Exception. In these two instances, a "scrivener's 
error" occurred, says ASCU. The district court accepted this argument and agreed that 
the Second Exception was the product of a scrivener's error. (R&O at 16.) Remarkably, 
the district court reached this conclusion as a matter of law even though the scrivener 
testified that there was no error; he wrote exactly what he intended and what his client 
wanted. That testimony should have at least created a disputed issue of fact. 
Further, the term "scrivener's error" is misleading. It implies that the mistake was 
the scrivener's alone and that ASCU was a passive victim of this alleged mistake. But 
ASCU had several chances to review the Second Exception, and even suggested several 
changes. If ASCU did not intend what the Second Exception says, it was grossly 
negligent in failing to catch what it now claims are "obvious typographical errors". 
(Aplee Br. at vi.) If they are so obvious, why did no one catch them at the time when 
1 
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drafts were going back and forth and changes were being proposed? The answer is that 
there was no mistake. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The district court did not merely apply the rules of contract construction. 
It applied the affirmative defense of mutual mistake and reformed the contract 
To appreciate why Wolf Mountain should win this appeal, it is important to 
understand exactly what the trial court did. ASCU argues on appeal that the trial court 
did not engage in a reformation analysis based on the doctrine of mutual mistake, "it 
simply applied the rules of contract construction." (Aplee Br. at 14.) There is no canon 
of construction that would allow a court to say that "mortgagee" means "mortgagor". 
This was not a question of interpretation; the question was whether there was a mistake. 
In other words, the question was whether the parties intended something other than the 
literal interpretation of the Second Exception. 
The district court expressly said that it was a mutual mistake. "The court 
concludes there was not a unilateral mistake here, but a mutual mistake, to the extent that 
is necessary to accomplish this type of reformation." (R.316.) The supposed mistake 
"was that each party twice left in the document the word 'mortgagee5 and did not note 
that it should have stated 'mortgagor' ...." (R.315.) In other words, the Court found that 
the contract as written did not conform to the parties' intent. That is the very definition 
of a mutual mistake. "Mutual mistake of fact may be defined as error in reducing the 
concurring intention of the parties to writing." RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935, 945 
(Utah 2004) (quotation marks omitted). 
2 
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The district court then held that the remedy for this supposed mistake was to 
reform the contract. The court explained that it was not engaged in reformation "as that 
concept is normally meant" (R.314), but was merely making the contract "conform to the 
parties intent" (R.315). But that is exactly what reformation is, and the district court 
acknowledged that "this is a type of reformation." (R.315.) The district court further 
acknowledged that finding a mutual mistake was "necessary to accomplish this type of 
reformation." (R.316.) That is simply another way of saying that if there was not a 
mutual mistake, the court could not reform the contract. 
In short, ASCU is wrong in its argument that "[t]he district court did not 'reform' 
the Leasehold Mortgage ..., it simply applied the rules of contract interpretation." 
(Aplee. Br. at 14.) The district court clearly did use the doctrine of mutual mistake to 
reform the contract to say something other than what its "literal interpretation" would 
have been. {Id. at 10.) 
B. The district court erred in finding as a matter of law that there was a 
mutual mistake. 
1. ASCU did not plead mutual mistake with specificity and did not 
argue mutual mistake. It was error for the district court to sua sponte raise 
and rely on mutual mistake to defend ASCU's breach. 
Mutual mistake is a "contractual defense". Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App 
96 f^ 10. This defense must be specifically pleaded or it is waived. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
9(b); Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah 1979) ("a party seeking reformation of a 
deed due to mutual mistake must plead such mistake with particularity"). ASCU did not 
3 
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plead it with specificity.1 Nor did ASCU argue or even try to prove to the district court 
that there was a mutual mistake. The district court itself raised the idea of a mutual 
mistake and the remedy of reformation. It is error for a district court to sua sponte raise 
and rely on an affirmative defense that has not been pleaded. See Hutcherson v. 
Lauderdale County, 326 F.3d 747, 757 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Courts generally lack the ability 
to raise an affirmative defense sua sponte."); Finkel v. Rornanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 88-89 
(2d Cir. 2009) (district court committed error by raising affirmative defense not raised by 
defendant). 
And make no mistake, it was used as a defense to Wolf Mountain's claim. Wolf 
Mountain sued ASCU for breaching the Leasehold Mortgage, and specifically the due-
on-sale provision. The default was established. As the district court explained, "The 
default at issue here is whether ASCU sold its stock or assets. It did beyond dispute. 
That is an event of default, unless one of the exceptions applies." (R.311.) ASCU relied 
on the Second Exception. By its actual terms, however, it only applies to a sale of the 
"Mortgagee's interest." ASCU concedes this: "If read literally, the Second Exception 
would carve out an exception to default for a transfer of Wolf s interest in The Canyons 
1
 In its appellate brief, Wolf Mountain states that "ASCU failed to plead 'mutual mistake' 
or even 'mistake' as an affirmative defense." That was incorrect. ASCU's third defense 
states, "Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of mistake." And ASCU's fourth 
defense states, "Plaintiffs claims are barred because they are based upon a scrivener's 
error." (Answer at 6.) Nevertheless, the defense is not pleaded with particularity as 
required by Rule 9(b). 
ASCU argues that Wolf Mountain waived this argument by not raising it below. See 
Aplee Br. at 18 n.7. Wolf Mountain did not have an opportunity to make this argument 
below. ASCU did not raise the defense of mutual mistake. The trial court raised it sua 
sponte. 
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...." (Aplee Br. at 11.) Consequently, unless there was a mistake justifying reformation, 
the Second Exception could not excuse ASCU's default. Wolf Mountain therefore 
proved its prima facie case. The only remaining issues were whether ASCU could rely 
on the affirmative defense of mutual mistake and, if there was a mistake, whether 
reformation was justified. ASCU did not specifically plead this defense, and that should 
have been the end of the question. 
2. The trial court improperly placed the burden on Wolf Mountain to 
prove the absence of a mistake. ASCU had the burden to prove mutual 
mistake by clear and convincing evidence. 
But even if the district court properly raised this affirmative defense, the burden of 
proving mutual mistake should have been placed on ASCU. It was not Wolf Mountain's 
burden to prove the absence of a mistake. Yet, the trial court assumed that Wolf 
Mountain bore the burden. (R.308.) As an affirmative defense, the burden was on 
ASCU to show the absence of disputed issues of material fact. "[BJecause courts are 
reluctant to change contractual obligations and rights . . ., the party seeking reformation 
must establish the mistake by clear and convincing proof that clinches what might 
otherwise be only probable to the mind." Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 
1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
There are numerous cases in this jurisdiction dealing with 
reformation of an instrument on the ground of mutual mistake. The 
guiding criteria are well established. Mutual mistake of fact may be 
defined as error in reducing the concurring intentions of the parties to 
writing. Evidence necessary to substantiate the mutual mistake of fact must 
be clear, definite and convincing, and the party seeking reformation should 
not be guilty of negligence in the execution of the contract or deed or laches 
in making timely application for its reformation. This principle has 
consistently been applied in equity throughout the reformation of 
instrument cases. 
5 
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Naisbittv. Hodges, 307 P.2d 620, 623 (Utah 1957). 
The trial court therefore erred in placing the burden on Wolf Mountain, and in not 
considering ASCU's own negligence in the execution of a contract that it now claims 
contained "obvious typographical errors." (Aplee Br. at vi.) 
3. Extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that there was no mutual 
mistake, even if the contract is supposedly unambiguous. The district court 
erred by excluding Wolf Mountain's extrinsic evidence. 
There are different types of mutual mistakes. At issue here is what the Utah 
Supreme Court has called an "error in the memorialization of an agreement...." 
Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 1989). There are also different 
remedies for mutual mistake. The contract may either be rescinded or reformed. Id. The 
Utah Supreme Court has explained the circumstances that justify reformation: 
It is the rule in this forum that the power to reform a written 
instrument by reason of mutual mistake exists under three alternative 
proofs: (1) that the instrument as made failed to conform to what both 
parties intended; or (2) that the claiming party was mistaken as to its actual 
content and the other party, knowing of this mistake, kept silent; or (3) that 
the claiming party was mistaken as to actual content because of fraudulent 
affirmative behavior. 
Id. at 5-6 (quotation marks omitted).3 
3
 The latter two circumstances are actually examples of unilateral mistakes that justify 
reformation. See Brown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah 1984) ("[T]he plaintiff 
must show mutual mistake of the parties or mistake on the part of one and fraud or 
inequitable conduct on the part of the other, as a result of which the instrument reflects 
something neither party had intended or agreed to."). In this case, the district court held 
that there was no unilateral mistake. "This is not a unilateral mistake situation. Even if it 
is viewed as such, Wolf did not engage in fraud nor remain silent after knowing of 
ASCU's'mistake.'" (R.317.) 
6 
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ASCU alleges and the district court held that the Second Exception in the 
Leasehold Mortgage did not conform to what the parties intended. But to justify 
summary judgment in favor of ASCU, ASCU had to prove this by clear and convincing 
evidence and also show the absence of disputed issues of material fact. "To reform a 
contract, the party claiming mistake must prove that the minds of both parties had been in 
agreement on a term which they mutually failed to incorporate into the writing." Warner 
v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah App. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
When a party to a contract alleges mutual mistake, parol evidence is admissible to 
show the mistake or the absence of a mistake. See RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935, 
945 (Utah 2004) (quotation marks omitted) (citing 66 Am.Jur.2d Reformation of 
Instruments § 114 (2001) ("[I]n suits to reform written instruments on the ground of fraud 
or mutual mistake, parol and other extrinsic evidence is admissible ... to show how the 
writing should be corrected in order to conform to the agreement or intention which the 
parties actually made or had."); Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 n.8 (Utah App. 
1990) ("Mutual mistake is an exception to the general rule that parol evidence may not 
contradict, vary, or add to a deed."). 
The district court decided that it did not need to consider extrinsic evidence 
because the Leasehold Mortgage was unambiguous. But it reached this conclusion only 
by assuming the mutual mistake. "If the document did not have those errors" the district 
court reasoned, "it would certainly be unambiguous ...." (R.311 (emphasis added).) 
After correcting the alleged mistakes, the district court held that the contract was not 
ambiguous, and therefore it did not need to consider extrinsic evidence of the alleged 
7 
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mistakes. This circular bootstrapping denied Wolf Mountain the opportunity of showing 
that there was no mistake. 
The district court proceeded backwards. Mutual mistake is about the content of a 
contract. ASCU alleged that the Leasehold Mortgage did not contain the words intended 
by the parties. Until that question was answered—i.e., until the content of the Leasehold 
Mortgage was established—it could not be interpreted. And parol evidence is clearly 
admissible when there is a dispute about whether the words used in a contract are what 
the parties intended. See Janke v. Beckstead, 332 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1950). It was 
patent error for the district court to conclude that there was a mutual mistake without 
allowing Wolf Mountain to submit extrinsic evidence that there was no mistake. 
4. The scrivener who committed the alleged scrivener's error testified 
that it was not a mistake. This creates a disputed issue of fact about the 
alleged mutual mistake. 
ASCU prepared the initial draft of the Leasehold Mortgage. (R.219.) Wolf 
Mountain's attorney, Bradley Rauch, inserted the due-on-sale provision, originally 
without any exceptions. (R.219.) ASCU deleted the provision. (R.220.) Wolf Mountain 
reinserted it. (R.220.) ASCU deleted it again and Rauch reinserted it again, this time 
with the Second Exception exempting a sale of the "Mortgagee's interest." (R.221-22.) 
ASCU made several minor changes to the Second Exception but otherwise accepted the 
language. (R.223.) Rauch testified: 
There was no typographical or scrivener's error in the final "due-on-
sale" clause incorporated into the final Leasehold Mortgage. The Second 
Exception to the Due-On-Sale Clause was intended to provide Wolf 
Mountain - the "Mortgagee" - with the right to enter into a joint 
transaction with ASCU to sell both of their interests in the resort and its 
8 
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underlying lands to a third party without triggering the Due-On-Sale 
Clause. 
(R.223.) 
There is no way? in the face of this testimony, that the district court could conclude 
as a matter of law that the Second Exception contains a mutual mistake. Mutual mistake 
requires clear and convincing evidence that "the instrument as made failed to conform to 
what both parties intended ...." Stangl, 778 P.2d at 5 (emphasis added). The Leasehold 
Mortgage says "mortgagee" and the scrivener testified that this was intentional. ASCU 
contradicts this intention, but that creates a conflict for the factfinder.4 
In order to say that there was a mutual mistake, the district court had to ignore 
Rauch's testimony, but doing so was improper because parol evidence is clearly 
admissible to disprove a claim of mutual mistake. See West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 
861 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah App. 1993) (trial court erred by not considering extrinsic 
evidence of parties' intent when mutual mistake was alleged). Nor could the district 
court say that Rauch's testimony lacked credibility. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co. 
v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (when considering a motion 
for summary judgment "[t]he trial court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility"). 
Rauch's testimony creates an obvious issue of fact and should have removed the decision 
from the court as a matter of law. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) 
4
 It may be that the parties had differing intentions and were simply talking past each 
other. That could explain the ostensible inconsistencies, especially those created by 
language inserted into the Second Exception by ASCU. If that is the case, then the use of 
the word "mortgagee" was not a mistake on Wolf Mountain's part, but a unilateral 
mistake on ASCU's part that would not justify reformation. 
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("A single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of fact.5'). Disputed facts 
should have precluded summary judgment in favor of ASCU on the issue of mutual 
mistake. See West One Trust Co., 861 P.2d at 1062 (court erred in granting summary 
judgment when there was a claim of mutual mistake and there were disputed issues about 
the parties' intent). Without clear and convincing and undisputed evidence of a mutual 
mistake—i.e., that both parties intended the contract to say something other than what it 
says—the district court could not invoke its equitable authority to reform the Leasehold 
Mortgage. 
5. Alternatively, the Leasehold Mortgage is ambiguous and its 
interpretation is a question of fact for the factfinder. 
As noted, the district court said that //the alleged mistake was corrected, the 
Leasehold Mortgage would be unambiguous. The mistake could be corrected only if 
there was undisputed evidence that it was a mistake. As noted, the scrivener testified that 
there was no mistake. The evidence of a mistake was not undisputed. 
ASCU accuses Wolf Mountain of trying to create ambiguity by offering an 
implausible interpretation of the Second Exception. Wolf Mountain is not offering a 
competing interpretation. The Leasehold Mortgage says what it says. It is ASCU that 
offers an interpretation that is inconsistent with the literal meaning. ASCU repeatedly 
acknowledges that Wolf Mountain's interpretation is the "literal" one and that as written 
the Leasehold Mortgage is ambiguous: 
• "The district court recognized that strictly as written, the Leasehold Mortgage led 
to an absurdity." (Aplee Br. at 4.) 
10 
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• "Read literally, the Second Exception would mean that a transfer of all or 
substantially all of Wolf s rights in The Canyons ... would not give rise to a 
default under the Leasehold Mortgage ...." (Aplee Br. at 6.) 
• "There are multiple other problems with Wolfs literal interpretation of the Due-
on-Sale clause in conjunction with the Second Exception." (Aplee Br. at 10.) 
• "If read literally, the Second Exception would carve out an exception to default 
for a transfer of Wolf s interest in The Canyons—which makes no sense." 
(Aplee Br. at 11.) 
For the reasons stated in Wolf Mountain's opening brief, the "literal" 
interpretation is not nonsensical or absurd, but is consistent with the parties' intention of 
creating an exception for & joint sale of ASCU's interests and Wolf Mountain's interests. 
If ASCU's interpretation is also plausible, then the Leasehold Mortgage is ambiguous 
and the district court could not interpret it as a matter of law. "When ambiguity exists [in 
a contract], the intent of the parties becomes a question of fact. A motion for summary 
judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in 
the contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended." WebBank v. Am. 
General Annuity Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1145 (Utah 2002) (internal quotation 
marks, citations, and brackets omitted). 
11 
4824-0861-2360 1 
CONCLUSION 
The dispute before this Court is about the content, not the meaning, of the 
Leasehold Mortgage. Does it say what the parties intended, or was there a mistake in 
drafting? The Court should not even reach that question. ASCU did not specifically 
plead and did not argue mutual mistake. It is an affirmative defense and was waived. If 
the Court reaches the issue, it should find that there are disputed issues of fact. The 
scrivener who wrote the Second Exception testified that there was no mistake. The trial 
court improperly ignored that testimony, even though it was clearly admissible and 
relevant to Wolf Mountain's intentions. ASCU opened the door to such testimony when 
it alleged that there was a mutual mistake in the Leasehold Mortgage. The district court's 
approach—find that there was a mutual mistake, reform the contract, then exclude 
extrinsic evidence because the contract, as reformed, is unambiguous—denied Wolf 
Mountain the opportunity to show that the contract, as written, conformed to its 
intentions. 
The district court committed legal error in granting ASCU's motion for summary 
judgment on an affirmative defense that it did not plead with particularity or raise in its 
briefing. Its decision should be reversed and Wolf Mountain's motion for summary 
judgment should be granted. 
12 
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